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After Shelby County v. Holder, Can Independent 
Commissions Take the Place of Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act? 
Brittany C. Armour
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2013 the Supreme Court, in Shelby County v. Holder, held that 
Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act
1
 was unconstitutional.
2
 Section 
4(b) was a preclearance formula that considered a State’s or county’s 
past practices (for example discriminatory tests), and the effect of 
those practices (for example low voter registration), then determined 
which States and counties were required to obtain authorization from 
federal authorities before changing voting procedures.
3
 Fast forward 
to 2013, the Supreme Court held in Shelby County that Section 4(b) 
was based on outdated data and therefore unconstitutional.
4
 
At the time the Shelby County decision came down, voters and 
some States were already using “independent redistricting 
commissions”5 as a way to combat partisan gerrymandering.6 In the 
2015 decision of Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission, the Supreme Court held that the Elections 
Clause and 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) (determining Congressional districts) 
 
 * J.D. (2017), Washington University School of Law; B.S.B.A (2012) Xavier 
University. Thank you to my family, friends, and especially to those of you on Journal, whose 
work made this Note publishable. 
 1. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316). 
 2. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 3. Id. at 2627.  
 4. Id. at 2631. 
 5. An independent commission “is a committee composed of appointed officials [usually 
private citizens] who assume responsibility for redistricting within a state.” NAACP Legal Def. 
& Educ. Fund, Independent Redistricting Commissions: Reforming Redistricting Without 
Reversing Progress Toward Racial Equality, at 1, http://www.naacpldf.org/files/publications/ 
IRC_Report.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). 
 6. Gerrymandering, infra note 67. 
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permitted the use of an independent commission to adopt 
congressional districts.
7
 This gave the use of independent 
commissions more legitimacy in the voting process.  
The Voting Rights Act is still needed in this country as more 
States are putting forth voting and election legislation that is facially 
neutral, but has a disparate impact on minorities’ opportunity to 
vote.
8
 Without some sort of preclearance or a “checks and balance” 
system, discriminatory voting laws will likely continue to pass in 
many States.
9
 An independent commission can step into the shoes 
that Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act use to fill. Part II of this 
note will explore the history of the Voting Rights Act and 
independent redistricting commissions, as well as an explanation of 
the pertinent Supreme Court cases mentioned above. Then in Part III, 
this note will explain the feasibility and effectiveness of using 
independent commissions in creating and implementing voting laws 
and procedures.  
II. HISTORY 
A. Voting Rights Act of 1965 
The Voting Rights Act (VRA)
10
 was passed in 1965 to eliminate 
discriminatory election practices, such as literacy tests, as well as to 
minimize the overall resistance by state officials to enforce the 
Fifteenth Amendment.
11
 The Fifteenth Amendment, one of the 
Reconstruction Amendments, granted African Americans the right 
vote in 1870.
12
 Soon after the ratification of the Fifteenth 
 
 7. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).  
 8. North Carolina offers a great example of a State putting forth new voting laws that 
have a disparate impact on minority voters: it passed discriminatory laws one month after the 
Shelby County. decision. Richard L. Hasen, This Is Why the Voting Rights Act Is on Trial in 
North Carolina, WASH. POST (July 31, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
cage/wp/2015/07/31/this-is-why-the-voting-rights-act-is-on-trial-in-north-carolina/.  
 9. Lopez, infra note 52.  
 10. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316). 
 11. Dep’t of Justice, History of Federal Voting Rights Laws, http://www.justice.gov/crt/ 
history-federal-voting-rights-laws (last updated Aug. 8, 2015). 
 12. The Fifteenth Amendment provides "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
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Amendment, blacks became very active in voting and were elected to 
office in both federal and state government. For example, in 1870, 
Hiram Rhoades Revels was elected to the U.S. Senate, becoming the 
first African American to sit in the U.S. Congress.
13
 Along with 
Senator Revels, a dozen other black men served in Congress and 
more than 600 served in state legislatures soon after the ratification of 
the Fifteenth Amendment.
14
 However, decades following the 
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, some states took great 
efforts to disenfranchise the black vote through Jim Crow laws.
15
 
African American voters across the South were now required to 
complete tasks like paying voting taxes, and passing literacy tests to 
vote.
16
 These discriminatory practices effectively deterred and 
prevented blacks from voting.
17
 Right around the ratification of the 
Fifteenth Amendment, sixty-seven percent of black adult men were 
registered to vote in 1867 in Mississippi. However, by 1892 only four 
percent of adult black men were registered to vote.
18
 After decades of 
discriminatory practices, the Civil Rights Movement led to the 
enactment of the VRA in 1965.
19
  
The VRA directly addressed the discriminatory practices used by 
the South to disenfranchise the black vote by granting oversight 
 
 13. Fifteenth Amendment, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/ 
fifteenth-amendment (last visited Oct. 11, 2015). 
 14. Id. See also RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD 
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 58 (Vintage Books ed. 2004) 
(“Black voters under Radical Reconstruction elected hundreds of black officials to state and 
local office . . . . Throughout the South, Reconstruction governments extended the franchise to 
many men of both races by reducing property qualifications . . . the laws passed by the radical 
legislatures were therapeutic and long overdue”).  
 15. African Americans and the 15th Amendment, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION, 
http://www.crf-usa.org/black-history-month/african-americans-and-the-15th-amendment (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2015). See also Fifteenth Amendment, supra note 13 (“In the ensuing decades, 
various discriminatory practices including poll taxes and literacy tests, along with intimidation 
and violence, were used to prevent African Americans from exercising their right to vote.”). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Fifteenth Amendment, supra note 13. 
 18. African Americans and the 15th Amendment, supra note 15.  
 19. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 11. It is incredibly important to point out that there is a 
long history of events that led to the passing of the VRA, and the brevity of that history in this 
Note is not to minimize the struggle that gave us the VRA. The VRA was enacted only after 
years of collective action, voting registration campaigns, and marches (including Bloody 
Sunday in Selma, Alabama on March 7, 1965). However, for the purposes of this section of the 
Note, the focus is mainly on the contents of the VRA. 
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power to the Attorney General of the United States.
20
 Specifically, 
Section 2 of the VRA uses similar language as the Fifteenth 
Amendment, making it unlawful to prevent anyone from voting based 
on his or her race.
21
 Section 4(b) provided a preclearance formula, in 
connection with Section 5.
22
 Section 5 was designed to ensure that 
voting changes in covered jurisdictions could not be implemented 
until the Department of Justice gave their approval.
23
 The 
preclearance formula of Section 4(b) originally consisted of two 
prongs. The first prong asked whether, on November 1, 1968, “the 
state maintained a ‘test or device’ restricting the opportunity to 
register and vote.”24 The second prong questioned whether “less than 
50 percent of persons of voting age were registered to vote on 
November 1, 1964, or that less than 50 percent of persons of voting 
age voted in the presidential election of November 1964.”25 A third 
prong, added in 1975, asked whether the state had a “practice of 
providing any election information, including ballots, only in English 
. . . where members of a single language minority constituted more 
than five percent of the citizens of voting.”26 This multi-prong 
 
 20. Fifteenth Amendment, supra note 13. 
 21. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 further provides that:  
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of 
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election 
in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members 
of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less 
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process 
and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a 
protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one 
circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section 
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to 
their proportion in the population.  
52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316). See also U.S. CONST. amend. XV, 
§ 1. 
 22. 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316).  
 23. 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316). 
 24. 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b). See also Dep’t of Justice, Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/section-4-voting-rights-act (last updated Aug. 8, 2015). The original 
statue states November 1, 1964, but this was changed to 1968 during the 1970 reauthorization, 
and then to 1972 in the 1975 reauthorization. Act of June 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 
314; Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400. 
 25. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 24; 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b). 
 26. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 24. See also 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b), (f) (Westlaw through 
Pub. L. No. 114-316). 
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preclearance formula subjected mostly Southern states, originally, to 
Section 5.
27
  
After the Voting Rights Act passed, Courts were tasked with 
applying the language of the statue to voter discrimination cases. The 
Supreme Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach addressed the 
constitutional limits of Congress enacting the Voting Rights Act, and 
requiring certain States (based on the preclearance formula in Section 
4(b)) to obtain authorization from the Attorney General when 
implementing changes to the voting procedures.
28
 The Court in 
Katzenbach adopted the following standard to address the balance of 
state and federal power in regards to voter discrimination:  
[T]he general rule . . . that States "have broad powers to 
determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may 
be exercised." The gist of the matter is that the Fifteenth 
Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of state power. 
"When a State exercises power wholly within the domain of 
state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review. But 
such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as 
an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right."
29
  
With this holding, the Supreme Court demonstrated that the VRA 
was a check on the States’ suffrage power.30 Section 2 and Section 5 
of the VRA were crucial in providing the necessary protections 
against the disenfranchisement of minorities. States retained the 
 
 27. The following states were subject to Section 5 preclearance based on the Section 4(b) 
formula: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, 
and Virginia. Also certain areas/districts in Florida, Michigan, North Carolina, California, 
South Dakota, and New York were subject to Section 5 preclearance based on Section 4(b) 
formula. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 24.  
 28. 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966). 
 29. Id. at 325 (internal citations omitted). The Court held that:  
[T]he portions of the Voting Rights Act properly before us are a valid means for 
carrying out the commands of the Fifteenth Amendment. Hopefully, millions of non-
white Americans will now be able to participate for the first time on an equal basis in 
the government under which they live. We may finally look forward to the day when 
truly “(t)he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged 
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.”  
Id. at 337.  
 30. Id.  
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power in regards to suffrage, but they could not run afoul the 
Fifteenth Amendment and the VRA.  
B. Shelby County v. Holder 
Less than fifty years after the passage of VRA, the Supreme Court 
substantially weakened the statute’s power in Shelby County v. 
Holder.
31
 The Court was presented with the question of whether the 
preclearance formula in Section 4(b) was constitutional.
32
 The 
petitioner, Shelby County, Alabama, was a covered jurisdiction under 
Section 5, which means Shelby County had to get permission from 
the Attorney General before altering voting procedures.
33
 In 2010, 
Shelby County sought a declaratory judgment that Sections 4(b) and 
5 of the VRA were facially unconstitutional in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia.
34
 The district court ruled against Shelby 
County, holding that the Sections of the VRA at issue were 
constitutional.
35
 According to the district court, the evidence before 
Congress in 2006 when reauthorizing the VRA was sufficient to 
justify the continuing usage of the preclearance formula in Section 
4(b).
36
  
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
district court.
37
 According to the D.C. Circuit, Section 2 litigation 
inadequately protected the rights of minority voters in covered 
jurisdictions, which is the conclusion that Congress came to in 
2006.
38
 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit ruled that Section 5 was still 
necessary.
39
 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the district and circuit courts. 
The Court, in a 5-4 split, ruled that the preclearance formula, as 
 
 31. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 32. Id. at 2619.  
 33. Id. at 2621–22. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 503–08 (2011).  
 36. Id. at 496–503.  
 37. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 884 (2012). The D.C. Circuit considered 
numerous factors when coming to their decision, including the Attorney General’s objections to 
voting changes, successful Section 2 suits in covered jurisdictions, and Section 5 preclearance 
suits involving covered jurisdictions. Id. at 873–83. 
 38. Id. at 873–83.  
 39. Id. at 873. 
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written, was unconstitutional.
40
 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the 
majority, cited numerous reasons why Section 4(b) was 
unconstitutional. One argument was that the preclearance formula 
was based on “decades-old data and eradicated practices . . . [t]he 
formula capture[ed] States by reference to literacy tests and low voter 
registration and turnout in the 1960s and early 1970s. But such tests 
ha[d] been banned nationwide for over 40 years.”41 Chief Justice 
Roberts’ next argued that the Fifteenth Amendment was “not 
designed to punish for the past; its purpose is to ensure a better 
future.”42  
Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts criticized Congress by saying 
that if Congress “is to divide the States—it must identify those 
jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that makes sense in light of 
current conditions. It cannot rely simply on the past.”43 Finally, the 
Court points out that the formula in Section 4(b) was the true 
problem, not the concept of preclearance (Section 5), and Congress 
could still fix it.
44
 Chief Justice Roberts gave Congress the following 
instructions:  
Congress may draft another formula based on current 
conditions. Such a formula is an initial prerequisite to a 
determination that exceptional conditions still exist justifying 
such an “extraordinary departure from the traditional course of 
relations between the States and the Federal 
Government[,]” . . . and while any racial discrimination in 
 
 40. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.  
 41. Id. at 2627. As it could be imagined the oral argument was eventful and filled with 
jaw dropping moments, as is any oral argument when the issue at hand is a hot topic and/or 
involves Constitutional rights. During oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts questioned the 
Government and the respondent (defenders of the VRA) as to why all states were not subject to 
preclearance, since voter suppression occurs in both non-covered states as well as covered 
states. Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 
12-96). See also Elizabeth Wydra, Post-argument Commentary: Voting Rights Are an American 
Entitlement, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 27, 2013, 4:18 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/ 
post-argument-commentary-voting-rights-are-an-american-entitlement. Justice Scalia, however, 
provided the boldest statement at the oral argument when he “second-guessed Congress’s 
motives for reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act in 2006, suggesting that it was ‘perpetuation of 
a racial entitlement.’” Wydra, supra; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra, at 41.  
 42. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629.  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 2631.  
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voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it 
passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions.
45
 
Therefore, Section 4(b) could be reinstated, as long as Congress used 
“current conditions” to create a preclearance formula.46  
Justice Ginsburg wrote a very powerful dissent, stating that “the 
Court errs egregiously by overriding Congress’ decision.”47 She 
explained that by striking Section 4(b) of VRA, the Court discounted 
“that one such condition was the preclearance remedy in place in the 
covered jurisdictions, a remedy Congress designed both to catch 
discrimination before it causes harm, and to guard against return to 
old ways.”48 The dissent also states that the Court did not “engage 
with the massive legislative record that Congress assembled” when 
coming to its decision.
49
 Justice Ginsburg was shocked by the Court’s 
failure to do so, since she “would expect more from an opinion 
striking at the heart of the Nation’s signal piece of civil-rights 
legislation.”50 Justice Ginsburg illustrated the problems with the 
majority holding stating, “[t]hrowing out preclearance when it has 
worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes is 
like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not 
getting wet.”51 
Only a few hours after the Shelby County opinion was announced, 
Texas—formerly covered by Section 4(b)—implemented voter 
identification laws formerly blocked under Section 5 of the VRA.
52
 
 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 2631. 
 47. Id. at 2652 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 48. Id. at 2650 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id. at 2644 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 2650 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 52. Tomas Lopez, Shelby County: One Year Later, THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 
(June 24, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/shelby-county-one-year-later. Justice 
Ginsburg, after the Shelby County opinion was issued, stated that she was not “surprised that 
Southern states have pushed ahead with tough voter identification laws and other measures 
since the Supreme Court freed them from strict federal oversight of their elections.” Mark 
Sherman, Ginsburg Says Push for Voter ID Laws Predictable, U.S. NEWS (July 26, 2013), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2013/07/26/ginsburg-says-push-for-voter-id-
laws-predictable. Furthermore, she indicated that “[t]he notion that because the Voting Rights 
Act had been so tremendously effective we had to stop it didn't make any sense to me . . . . And 
one really could have predicted what was going to happen.” Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/23
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According to the Brennan Center for Justice, in less than a year after 
the Supreme Court’s ruling of Shelby County, statewide and local 
voting laws were passed that likely would have been, and historically 
were, blocked by Section 5.
53
 Examples include strict photo 
identification laws, significant limitations on early voting, and 
reduced time for voter registration.
54
 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County, Section 2 
litigation ineffectively challenges voter discrimination and is more 
expensive, compared to Section 5.
55
 Additionally, Section 2 litigation 
may allow plaintiffs “to establish a statistical disparity between 
minorities and whites as well as a material burden on voting—
meaning that preclearance would have been denied—but will be 
unable to show the ‘something more’ required for Section 2 
liability.”56 Therefore, Section 2 litigation is not producing the same 
results by preventing voter dilution in States that were formerly 
covered by Section 5. As a result, the VRA has been substantially 
weakened.   
 
 53. Lopez, supra note 52, at 4–5. 
 54. Id. at 2–3, 5. 
 55. Id. at 2, 6. According to the Brennan Center for Justice, “[c]hallenging restrictive laws 
one by one under Section 2 or some other law is considerably more expensive than the 
administrative preclearance process these individual challenges now have to replace.” Also, 
Section 5 no longer has enough of a presence to encourage accountability. Tomas Lopez says 
that,  
[b]ecause covered jurisdictions had to provide notice to the DOJ whenever they made 
a change to their voting systems, there was also a centralized method to monitor those 
changes before they were implemented. The public benefited from that accountability. 
Without Section 5, thousands of changes to voting procedures may go unnoticed.  
Id. at 6–7.  
 56. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Article: The South After Shelby County, 2013 SUP. CT. 
REV. 55, 110 (2013). Litigation under Section 2 and Section 5 are vastly different in regards to 
procedure and substance. Under Section 2, the plaintiff has the initial burden of proving that a 
policy is invalid/unlawful. Id. at 63. On the contrary, the jurisdiction has the initial burden 
under Section 5. Id. at 64. Also, a questionable voting practice stays in effect during the Section 
2 litigation, unless the plaintiff can secure a preliminary injunction. Which is why addressing 
mass disenfranchisement with Section 2 is so difficult in comparison to Section 5. Id. at 60.  
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C. History of Independent Redistricting Commissions 
Not only does the VRA prevent voter discrimination, but it also 
provides protections against discriminatory redistricting.
57
 An 
Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC) is used by some states 
during the redistricting process.
58
 The United States Constitution 
requires that seats of the House of Representatives be apportioned 
based on state population, according to the constitutionally mandated 
Census.
59
 Every ten years, if the population changes in an individual 
state, in comparison to other states, then the number of seats in the 
House of Representatives for each state is adjusted.
60
 This process is 
called “reapportionment.”61 The state is then divided into districts, 
with each district having a seat in the House of Representatives.
62
 
The districts are redrawn if it is determined that the population has 
changed within a district.
63
 Redistricting is necessary so that each 
member of the House of Representatives is representing an 
“proportionate” amount of citizens.”64 This process occurs in both 
federal and state legislatures.
65
  
Redistricting must comply with Section 2 of the VRA, in that the 
districts cannot be drawn in such a way as to essentially minimize or 
erase the vote of minorities, which is considered vote dilution.
66
 
 
 57. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, supra note 5, at 3. 
 58. Id.  
 59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 60. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, supra note 5, at 2. 
 61. Id. (the report explains that reapportionment occurs once every ten years, based on the 
results of the Census). See also 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1996) (explaining the process of the 
reapportionment of Representatives based on the Census’ figures). 
 62. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, supra note 5, at 2. 
 63. 2 U.S.C. § 2a. 
 64. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, supra note 5, at 2. 
 65. Id. 
 66. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316). This section states that: 
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure 
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which 
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote 
on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 
10303(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b).  
Id. See also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, EVERYTHING YOU ALWAYS WANTED TO KNOW 
ABOUT REDISTRICTING 6 (2001), https://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/ redistricting_ 
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When vote dilution does occur, this is called gerrymandering.
67
 In 
states that were subject to preclearance of the VRA, purposeful voter 
dilution through redistricting was usually prevented by the 
Department of Justice.
68
  
However, voters in states that were not subjected to preclearance 
depended on Section 2 litigation
69
 as a way to prevent or redress the 
harms that could occur as part of redistricting.
70
 As explained earlier, 
Section 2 litigation is expensive and not as effective in addressing 
possible violations of the VRA.
71
 Therefore, states and their citizens 
faced the task of using a different approach to combat 
gerrymandering. In the early 1960s, redistricting reform efforts were 
aimed at “substantial population equality among election districts,”72 
and began due in part to the historic “one person, one vote” principle 
from the 1963 Supreme Court ruling in Gray v. Sanders.
73
 Starting at 
 
manual.pdf. Vote dilution is “the use of redistricting plans and other voting practices that 
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial and other minorities.” Id.  
 67. Gerrymandering is “the practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, 
often of highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the 
opposition's voting strength.” Gerrymandering, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
Furthermore, racial gerrymandering is gerrymandering along racial lines, or with excessive 
regard for the racial composition of the electorate. Id. In one Supreme Court case holding a 
racial gerrymandering claim valid under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court  
conclude[d] that a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal 
Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race-
neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to 
separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks 
sufficient justification.  
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993). Additionally, an Ohio district court noted that: 
Although courts are reluctant to provide relief on claims that a district has been 
gerrymandered to protect an incumbent's seat . . . this rule does not hold when the 
manipulations were conducted on a race-conscious basis. Like the Seventh Circuit, we 
see “little point . . . in distinguishing discrimination based on an ultimate objective of 
keeping certain white incumbents in office from discrimination borne of pure racial 
animus.”  
Armour v. Ohio, 775 F. Supp. 1044, 1061 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (internal citations omitted). 
 68. See Lopez, supra note 52. 
 69. However, due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County, now voters in all 
states depend on Section 2 litigation.  
 70. See Lopez, supra note 52 and accompanying text.  
 71. Id.  
 72. J. Gerald Hebert & Marina K. Jenkins, The Need for State Redistricting Reform to 
Rein in Partisan Gerrymandering, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 543, 545 (2011). 
 73. 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (holding that “[t]he conception of political equality from the 
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the turn of the twenty-first century, a movement began towards 
“redistricting reform on the state level.”74 IRCs emerged as a 
plausible solution.
75
  
Currently, almost half the states use IRCs in some capacity.
76
 The 
IRCs in most states include a member of the state’s legislature, and 
possibly citizens appointed by the legislature. “[O]nly Arizona and 
California have IRCs that completely exclude elected officials from 
the process.”77 In Arizona and California, members of the Republican 
and Democratic Parties, as well Independent representatives, 
nominate individuals (citizens) to be part of the IRC.
78
 By having 
both parties and independents select members to the IRC, the hope is 
that there will be greater transparency, citizen approval through direct 
democracy, and partisan and racial balance.
79
 
In some states, the voters decided whether to use an IRC, either 
through an initiative or a referendum.
80
 In Arizona, the districts 
drawn by the IRC created more competitive elections, in comparison 
to elections across the country.
81
  
 
Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, 
and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote,” when 
addressing the issue of a state party primary election giving greater weight to votes of citizens 
from rural counties than to votes of residents of urban counties). 
 74. Herbet & Jenkins, supra note 72, at 556.  
 75. Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 
1808, 1817–21 (2012). 
 76. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, supra note 5 (explaining that IRCs 
have varying forms—some are a subset of the legislature; some serve as a fail-safe alternative if 
the legislature cannot agree; and others advise the legislature in its redistricting process).  
 77. Id.  
 78. See generally Cain, supra note 75 at 1821–37. 
 79. See id. The Arizona and California independent redistricting commissions have 
greater transparency in comparison to the decisions made by the government and political 
groups. Arizona and California’s scheme embodies: “transparency, options for third-party map 
submissions, citizen approval through direct democracy . . . partisan and racial balance . . . a 
supermajority voting rule, and a proclivity towards so-called neutral criteria such as 
compactness, respect for city and county lines, and preserving communities of interest.” Id. at 
1812. 
 80. Cain, supra note 75 at 1830–33.  
 81. Sam Gringlas, Success of Independent Redistricting Boards a Work in Progress, NBC 
NEWS (July 27, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/independent-
redistricting-boards-are-constitutional-how-effective-are-they-n399311. “According to a New 
York Times analysis, the 2001 and 2011 maps drawn by independent commission in Arizona 
produced some of the most competitive races in the country. In 2014, two Arizona 
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One criticism of IRCs is that they completely exclude elected 
officials from the process, which is unconstitutional.
82
 The Arizona 
Legislature, in the 2015 Supreme Court case Arizona State 
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, argued 
that the Constitution’s Elections Clause83 prohibits a state from 
cutting the legislature out of the process of drawing new districts.
84
  
D. Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission 
As previously stated, Arizona is one of two states that have IRCs 
that completely exclude elected officials from the process.
85
 
However, prior to 2000, “the Arizona State Constitution granted the 
State Legislature the ability to draw congressional districts.”86 After 
the 2000 Census, the Arizona voters passed Proposition 106, “an 
initiative aimed at the problem of gerrymandering,”87 which amended 
the state constitution to remove the congressional redistricting power 
from the Legislature and vest it in the Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission.
88
 The IRC was tasked with redistricting 
Arizona after the 2010 Census.
89
 
In 2012, after the IRC approved a new congressional district map, 
the State Legislature sued the IRC, arguing that the IRC and its map 
 
congressional districts were among 29 nationwide where the race was decided by less than 5 
percent of the vote.” Id. 
 82. See Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2658–59, 2670. See also Gringlas, supra 
note 81, at 3. 
 83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but 
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of 
chusing Senators.”). 
 84. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 
 85. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, supra note 5 at 3. 
 86. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2658. See also Arizona State Legislature v. 
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-
1314 (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). The Supreme Court in Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. 
Redistricting Comm’n stated that past “redistricting plans adopted by the Arizona Legislature 
sparked controversy in every redistricting cycle since the 1970s, and several of those plans were 
rejected by a federal court or refused preclearance by the Department of Justice under the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965.” 135 S. Ct. at 2661.  
 87. 135 S. Ct. at 2655. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
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violated the Elections Clause of the Constitution.
90
 The Legislature 
argued, further, that by removing redistricting authority from the 
Legislature and giving authority to the IRC, the new district map was 
unconstitutional.
91
 Along with preventing the State from adopting the 
IRC-approved district map, the State Legislature also requested that 
the district court “permanently enjoin” the IRC “from adopting, 
implementing, or enforcing the new congressional district map.”92 
The IRC argued that, “for Elections Clause purposes, ‘the 
Legislature’ is not confined to the elected representatives; rather, the 
term encompasses all legislative authority conferred by the State 
Constitution, including initiatives adopted by the people 
themselves.”93 After determining that the Arizona State Legislature 
had standing to sue,
94
 a three-judge district court panel rejected the 
State Legislature’s complaint on the merits.95 The Supreme Court 
“postponed jurisdiction” and took the case on appeal from the district 
court.
96
  
 The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 ruling, held that the “lawmaking 
power in Arizona includes the initiative process, and that both § 2a(c) 
and the Elections Clause permit use of the AIRC in congressional 
districting in the same way the Commission is used in districting for 
Arizona’s own Legislature.”97 The Court examined previous cases 
that addressed the issue of redistricting, as well as the language of 
2 U.S.C. § 2a(c).
98
 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, pointed 
 
 90. Id. at 2658–59. 
 91. Id. The Arizona State Legislature also argued that because “‘Legislature’ in the 
Elections Clause means [specifically and only] the representative body which makes the laws of 
the people, . . . the Clause precludes resort to an independent commission, created by initiative, 
to accomplish redistricting.” Id. at 2659 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  
 92. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 
1048 (D. Ariz. 2014). See also OYEZ, supra note 86. 
 93. 135 S. Ct. at 2659. 
 94. Id. In determining standing, the Supreme Court believed that Proposition 106 “strips 
the Legislature of its alleged prerogative to initiate redistricting. That asserted deprivation 
would be remedied by a court order enjoining the enforcement of Proposition 106.” Id. at 2663. 
The Legislature had standing since Proposition 106, “would ‘completely nullif[y]’ any vote by 
the Legislature, now or ‘in the future,’ purporting to adopt a redistricting plan.” Id. at 2665 
(internal citation omitted).  
 95. Id. at 2659. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 2666–71.  
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out that “[r]edistricting is a legislative function, to be performed in 
accordance with the State’s prescriptions for lawmaking, which may 
include the referendum and the Governor’s veto.”99 A proposed 
amendment to a state Constitution, and a referendum brought by the 
citizens are considered part of the “legislature.”100 This principle was 
established by Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, as Justice Ginsburg 
pointed out, “[f]or redistricting purposes . . . ‘the Legislature’ did not 
mean the representative body alone. Rather, the word encompassed a 
veto power lodged in the people.”101  
Next, the Court turned to the language of 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c).
102
 
Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the language of the statute allows 
for states to use five different methods for redistricting.
103
 The Court 
held that the language of the statue “permits use of a commission to 
adopt Arizona’s congressional district.”104 Therefore, since Arizona’s 
IRC redistricted “in the manner provided by the law thereof,” the 
redistricting plan became the “presumptively governing map.”105 
 
 99. Id. at 2668.  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 2666 (citing Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 569 (1916)).  
 102. 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) The statute states:  
Until a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof after any 
apportionment, the Representatives to which such State is entitled under such 
apportionment shall be elected in the following manner: (1) If there is no change in the 
number of Representatives, they shall be elected from the districts then prescribed by 
the law of such State, and if any of them are elected from the State at large they shall 
continue to be so elected; (2) if there is an increase in the number of Representatives, 
such additional Representative or Representatives shall be elected from the State at 
large and the other Representatives from the districts then prescribed by the law of 
such State; (3) if there is a decrease in the number of Representatives but the number 
of districts in such State is equal to such decreased number of Representatives, they 
shall be elected from the districts then prescribed by the law of such State; (4) if there 
is a decrease in the number of Representatives but the number of districts in such State 
is less than such number of Representatives, the number of Representatives by which 
such number of districts is exceeded shall be elected from the State at large and the 
other Representatives from the districts then prescribed by the law of such State; or (5) 
if there is a decrease in the number of Representatives and the number of districts in 
such State exceeds such decreased number of Representatives, they shall be elected 
from the State at large.  
Id. 
 103. 135 S. Ct. at 2666, 2670.  
 104. Id. at 2668. 
 105. Id. at 2670.  
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Finally, the Court held that “the Elections Clause permits the 
people of Arizona to provide for redistricting by independent 
commission.”106 Justice Ginsburg first pointed out that the word 
“legislature” is defined in dictionaries as “[t]he power that makes 
laws,” even in the dictionaries in “circulation during the founding 
era.”107 Using that meaning of legislature, the Court found that 
“initiatives adopted by the voters legislate for the State” have the 
power to make laws “just as measures passed by the representative 
body do.”108 Chief Justice Roberts, writing one of the dissents, argued 
that the Elections Clause’s use of the word “legislature” should be 
read to mean “institutional body of representatives.”109 Nevertheless, 
defining “legislature” to mean “the power to make laws” gives voter 
initiatives and referenda a great deal of power.
110
  
The Court based their holding on the principle that the 
government’s power is derived from the people.111 As a result, the 
Court held that “it would be perverse to interpret the term 
‘Legislature’ in the Elections Clause so as to exclude lawmaking by 
the people, particularly where such lawmaking is intended to check 
legislators’ ability to choose the district lines they run in.”112 Justice 
Ginsburg explained that the people of the state have power, and an 
IRC, created through a referendum, is a check on the government.
113
 
 
 106. Id. at 2671. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. at 2679 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts goes on to argue that the 
term “legislature” is unambiguous: “[t]he unambiguous meaning of ‘the Legislature’ in the 
Elections Clause as a representative body is confirmed by other provisions of the Constitution 
that use the same term in the same way.” Id. at 2680 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 110. Howe, infra note 114.  
 111. Howe notes that: 
The Framers may not have imagined the modern initiative process in which the people 
of a State exercise legislative power coextensive with the authority of an institutional 
legislature. But the invention of the initiative was in full harmony with the 
Constitution’s conception of the people as the font of governmental power. As 
Madison put it: “The genius of republican liberty seems to demand . . . not only that all 
power should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted [sic] with it should 
be kept in dependence on the people.”  
Id. at 2674–75. 
 112. Id. at 2675. 
 113. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2675 (citing Cain, supra note 75, at 1817). 
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One legal scholar argues that if the Court would have decided the 
opposite way, other voter initiatives would be in jeopardy, if not 
completely invalid.
114
 The Court’s holding in this case reaffirmed the 
power the people have over the government.
115
 The next section of 
this note will address the practicability and possible impact an 
independent commission can have in deciding a state’s voting 
practices and procedures.  
III. ANALYSIS/PROPOSAL 
Both Supreme Court cases, Shelby County
116
 and Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission,
117
 shed light not only on the 
sanctity of voting, but also on the numerous attacks on the right to 
vote. In order to protect the former and eliminate the latter, it is 
essential to devise a plan that is a reliable and non-partisan method to 
protect the right to vote. One way to do this is to put independent 
commissions in charge of voting and election procedures.  
The purpose of the Voting Rights Act is to ensure that state and 
local governments do not pass laws or policies that deny American 
citizens the right to vote.
118
 As discussed previously, the impact of 
the Supreme Court’s holding that Section 4(b) of the VRA was 
unconstitutional was immediate.
119
 States took the decision as an 
 
 114. See Amy Howe, Independent Redistricting Commission Survives Challenge: In Plain 
English, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 30, 2015, 3:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 2015/06/ 
independent-redistricting-commission-survives-challenge-in-plain-english/ (arguing that 
interpreting “legislature” to mean “the power to make laws” leaves “a whole host of other voter 
initiatives, ranging from Ohio’s ban on straight-ticket voting along party lines to a California 
law establishing permanent voter registration, in place.”). 
 115. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2677.  
 116. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 117. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 
 118. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 11.  
 119. Lopez, supra note 52. On the same day Shelby County was decided, Texas (a state 
previously subjected to the preclearance formula) stated it would implement stricter photo ID 
laws that were previously blocked by the VRA because of their racial impact. Id. The Texas 
photo ID law required voters to show an approved form of photo ID in order to vote, including: 
“a driver’s license, a United States passport, a concealed-handgun license and an election 
identification certificate issued by the State Department of Public Safety.” Erik Eckholm, Texas 
ID Law Called Breach of Voting Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2015/08/06/us/appellate-panel-says-texas-id-law-broke-us-voting-rights-act.html?login 
=email&_r=0. Also, research by the Brennan Center showed that that “between 600,000 and 
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opportunity to implement voting laws and procedures that were either 
previously blocked by the VRA or may have been blocked by the 
VRA.
120
 The result has been catastrophic. Since the Shelby County 
decision, the disenfranchisement of minorities has grown and the 
impact of the VRA continues to diminish.
121
 In 2016, three years after 
Shelby County was decided, there were 868 fewer polling places for 
voters in numerous counties that were previously subjected to 
Section 5 preclearance.
122
 It is also worth noting that before Arizona 
adopted an IRC, the Department of Justice rejected numerous 
redistricting plans created by the State’s Legislature.123 While 
Arizona was proactive in addressing the problematic plans well 
before the Supreme Court ruled that Section 4(b) was 
unconstitutional in Shelby County, it is easy to imagine how 
pervasive unequal redistricting will become in the absence of 
Section 4(b). 
Chief Justice Roberts’s ideal solution to the issue at hand would 
be for Congress to create a new preclearance formula based on more 
current data, if Congress decides to reauthorize the VRA.
124
 
However, that solution seems unlikely
125
 and warrants the exploration 
of alternative solutions. If the United States is going to stay true to its 
democratic values and honor the sacrifices of those responsible for 
the Civil Rights Movement, immediate action needs to occur to 
rectify the disenfranchisement of minorities and restore the sanctity 
of voting.  
While Section 2 can be used to address disenfranchisement and 
discriminatory voting laws, it lacks Section 5’s preventive power. 
The Supreme Court discussed during the oral argument whether 
 
800,000 registered voters in Texas lacked [the required] photo ID, over 300,000 of them 
Latino.” Lopez, supra note 52. 
 120. Lopez, supra note 52, at 2–3 (in addition to Texas, after the Shelby County decision 
North Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi moved forward with stricter voting laws, and other 
States have attempted or proposed to pass statewide laws limiting voting). 
 121. Lopez, supra note 52, at 8. 
 122. Ari Berman, There Are 868 Fewer Places to Vote in 2016 Because the Supreme Court 
Gutted the Voting Rights Act, NATION (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/ there-
are-868-fewer-places-to-vote-in-2016-because-the-supreme-court-gutted-the-voting-rights-act/. 
 123. 135 S. Ct. at 2661. 
 124. See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629. 
 125. GOVTRACK, infra note 136. 
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Section 2 of the VRA would adequately address discriminatory 
practices if Section 5 were no longer enforceable.
126
 It was clear from 
the oral argument, that Solicitor General Donald Verrilli and some of 
the Supreme Court Justices doubted that Section 2 was an adequate 
substitute.
127
 This further supports the argument that the power of the 
VRA has diminished due to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shelby 
County. While the Fifth Circuit eventually held that the strict photo 
ID law implemented by Texas in 2013 was in violation of the VRA 
on Section 2 grounds,
128
 the decision left uncertain whether states 
need to get permission before implementing certain changes to voting 
requirements/laws.
129
 Without requiring states to seek some level of 
approval before implementing voting laws, the damage will already 
have occurred before the litigation process can begin.  
The subsequent actions taken by several states after the Shelby 
County decision, as well as this country’s history of discrimination, it 
is not difficult to understand why the act of voting can create issues 
and incite debates, especially when a minority group argues that a 
specific law or procedure results in vote dilution. Along with photo 
ID laws, different redistricting techniques are used to dilute the 
minority vote.
130
 This is why IRCs that address discriminatory 
political gerrymandering are so vital to protecting the right to vote. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the people have the “right to 
incorporate themselves into a State’s lawmaking apparatus.”131 As a 
result of this holding, independent commissions have the legal 
authority to participate in lawmaking. Furthermore, it shed light on 
the fact that when citizens collectively act, change can occur. The 
voters of Arizona recognized the impact of political gerrymandering, 
and decided to take measures into their own hands. The same effort 
 
 126. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 41, at 55–56. 
 127. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 41, at 35–41. 
 128. Eckholm, supra note 119. 
 129. Lyle Denniston, Texas Voter ID Law Ruled Invalid—In Part, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 6, 
2015, 9:55 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/08/texas-voter-id-law-ruled-invalid-in-part-
2/ (a judge would need to find that the legislature acted with biased/discriminatory intent, in 
order to have the authority “to order Texas in the future to seek official federal approval in 
Washington, D.C., before it could put into effect any new election laws, of any kind.”). 
 130. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 66, at 6–7. 
 131. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. at 2660 n.3 (citing Pacific States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912)). 
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could be used to correct the harms of Shelby County, and fill the void 
of Section 4(b). 
When looking at the aftermath of the Shelby County decision, it is 
clear that politics and partisanship can lead to discriminatory laws. 
The success of the independent commissions in Arizona and other 
states alike in having more balanced and fair districts is very 
promising.
132
 This leads to the question: what other responsibilities 
can independent commissions have in the voting process? It is worth 
noting that even after the Supreme Court decision of Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission, there are limits to the actions 
or responsibilities an independent commission can have in the 
creation of voting laws since it is highly unlikely that any court 
would allow the state legislature to be completely left out of deciding 
the state’s voting procedures.  
However, recognizing that there will be limits to the ability of 
independent commissions, there are still plenty of opportunities for 
more oversight and input in the voting laws and procedures. The 
Supreme Court did not rule Section 5 of the VRA unconstitutional,
133
 
which means that the Court believes that some form of oversight or 
“check” on state voting procedures is constitutional. Therefore, this 
responsibility could be shifted to an independent commission within 
a state.  
If this shift is going to take place, there are several factors to 
consider. First, who decides if an independent commission is 
necessary in a certain state? Since Shelby County held Section 4(b) 
unconstitutional, with the primary complaint being that the 
preclearance formula used outdated data,
134
 the determination of 
whether to implement an independent commission will have to be 
based on recent data. However, even with recent data, there’s still 
that question of who within the state will determine that an 
independent commission is needed. One way to do this is to have the 
voters in the state make that decision, just like in Arizona, where the 
 
 132. See Cain, supra note 75, at 1827, 1832. 
 133. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631. 
 134. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627; supra text accompanying note 41. 
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decision to have an independent commission was adopted through an 
initiative.
135
 
Leaving it up to the voters could work, but would more than likely 
require a grassroots type of engagement to educate the voters about 
the independent commission and the reasons why it is so necessary to 
add the commission to the voting process. However, as with 
Section 2 (VRA) litigation, this process could result in waiting for 
voters to initiate the referendum while or after the state implements 
practices/procedures that will have an adverse impact on minorities. 
Therefore, this would be an ex post reaction where the voters will 
recognize there's a need for an independent commission after the 
harm has been done. Nevertheless, a strong grassroots-type 
movement to push for a referendum that could be fruitful in certain 
states if the voters anticipate that the government will enact future 
discriminatory voting procedures.  
Another option is to have congressional action requiring certain 
states to adopt an independent commission. However, this is an 
unlikely solution since Congress has yet to vote on several proposed 
bills aimed at fixing Section 4(b),
136
 as suggested by the Supreme 
Court in Shelby County. The lack of congressional action is the very 
reason why an alternative solution is necessary to combat the harm 
done by the Shelby County decision.  
If a grassroots type of action is best option to initiate an 
independent commission, the next determination is about 
membership in the commission. Using Arizona as the template for 
independent commissions,
137
 members of the Republican and 
Democratic parties, as well as independents, can nominate state 
residents to the commission, as explained earlier.
138
 This will ensure 
that no political party has a significant influence over the voting 
 
 135. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. at 2658.  
 136. See, e.g., Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2015, S. 1659, 114th Cong. (referred to 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, June 24, 2015). See also S. 1659—114th Congress: Voting Rights 
Advancement Act of 2015, GOVTRACK, (Dec. 31, 2016) https://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bills/114/s1659 (indicating that the Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2015 had a one percent 
chance of being enacted).  
 137. Gringlas, supra note 81. In the article, Arizona’s independent redistricting 
commission is described as “one of the most transparent entities in Arizona history” and 
explained that the meetings were “live-streamed and transcribed for the public.” 
 138. See Cain, supra note 75, at 1832–37; supra text accompanying note 78.  
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process. Additionally, the commission should be diverse. Even if 
there’s equal representation of political parties, minorities and 
women are traditionally missing from the decision-making process.
139
 
This is something that needs to be considered if the commission is 
entrusted with deciding voting laws and procedures so as to not run 
afoul of the VRA.  
The last factor to consider is what procedures will be in the 
control of the commission? In order to retain the sanctity of the VRA, 
it is imperative that the commission is in control of the logistics of 
voting that potentially results in discrimination. For instance, the 
commission would decide the location of polling places. Another 
responsibility for the commission would be to make decisions 
regarding early voting, possible photo identification requirements, 
and other voting procedures. Also, the commission would follow the 
lead of Arizona, and have control over redistricting. In states where 
an independent commission is created via a referendum, it may be 
best for the voters to decide the duties and tasks of the independent 
commission.  
Regardless of responsibilities and make-up, all independent 
commissions created for the purpose of creating voting laws and 
procedures should have the obligations described above as a starting 
point. Also, oversight will be necessary throughout this process. 
However, since the success of Arizona’s commission is partly 
attributed to the transparency during the decision-making process,
140
 
transparency will be important to the success of an independent 
commission for voting.
141
  
Without having an example of an independent commission used in 
this way, it is difficult to affirmatively say that a commission will 
 
 139. Steve Bickerstaff, Making Local Redistricting Less Political: Independent 
Redistricting Commissions for U.S. Cities, 13 ELECTION L.J. 419, 426–27 (2014). Bickerstaff 
also explains that “[o]ne common objective for selecting members of a commission is diversity 
among members of the redistricting commission . . . willing to put impartiality above partisan 
or faction allegiance.” Id.  
 140. Gringlas, supra note 81; supra text accompanying note 137. 
 141. See Cain, supra note 75, at 1826. However, while transparency is missing in the 
political process, it can sometimes lead to higher scrutiny of the members of the independent 
commissions. Id. at 1812. While this may be true, any amount of transparency is in the best 
interest of the community at large, since that would put the necessary pressure on the 
independent commission to create non-discriminatory voting procedures.  
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effectively prevent common discriminatory voting practices. 
However, states with IRCs have seen great success in reining in 
gerrymandering. By using the models set forth in those states (for 
example Arizona and California), an independent commission for 
voting procedures should be just as successful. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Voting Rights Act is one of the most important civil rights 
statues we have in this country. The decades of protests, marches, and 
sacrifices resulted in a historic piece of legislation that worked. The 
Voting Rights Act was successful in ensuring that all citizens were 
able to vote without having to overcome certain barriers.
142
 This 
changed in 2013 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby 
County.
143
 The Supreme Court finding that Section 4(b) of the Voting 
Rights Act was unconstitutional in Shelby County had immediate 
repercussions.
144
 The Texas Legislature enacting discriminatory 
voting laws only moments after the Shelby County decision is a clear 
indication of the previous effectiveness of Section 4(b). It is very 
evident that there is still a need for a check on states in regards to 
ensuring a citizen’s right to vote. Congressional action seems 
unlikely, and Section 2 litigation is an inadequate alternative.  
An adequate replacement for Section 4(b) is independent 
commissions. Currently, states that utilize independent redistricting 
commissions have been successful in eliminating the discriminatory 
practice of gerrymandering. The viability and validity of independent 
redistricting commissions was affirmed with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, holding 
that the use of independent redistricting commissions is 
constitutional.
145
  
The Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission decision 
offers a new and innovative way to determine who makes the 
decisions regarding voting laws and procedures. Commissions such 
 
 142. See 383 U.S. at 325; supra text accompanying note 29.  
 143. 133 S. Ct. 2612. 
 144. See, e.g., Lopez, supra note 52.  
 145. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2652. 
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as this can be used to protect important voting rights in the absence of 
Section 4(b) and the diminished effectiveness of Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act. Make no mistake, this is not an easy task. It will 
be up to the voters to make this decision, and to put forth the effort. 
While it may take a grassroots effort and a voter initiative (like a 
referendum) to establish an independent commission, the success of 
IRCs in Arizona and California is encouraging. The work of 
countless Americans who fought for the right to vote is in jeopardy. 
A possible solution is an independent commission, which will allow 
the people to restore and protect the right to vote for all. 
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